When Can the Tax Tribunal Hear Your Case? Understanding Jurisdiction and Appealable Decisions

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 00952 (TC) Case Number: TC 09927 FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL TAX CHAMBER Location: Decided on the papers Appeal reference: TC/2025/03837 VAT – jurisdiction – Rule 8(2)(a) – absence of appealable decision – no free-standing supervisory jurisdiction – mandatory strike out Judgment date: 24 June 2026 Decided by: TRIBUNAL JUDGE GERAINT WILLIAMS Between SOLAR POWER PV LIMITED Appellant and THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS Respondents The Tribunal determined the application on the papers without a hearing, both parties having made representations in respect of the application. DECISION Introduction 1. This decision concerns an application made by the Respondents (“HMRC”) to strike out the Appellant’s proceedings pursuant to Rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 on the basis that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction.

2. The Appellant resists that application. It contends that it is entitled to repayment of the sum of £28,697.38 and that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine that claim.

3. The application therefore raises a single but fundamental question, namely whether, properly characterised, the proceedings fall within the statutory jurisdiction of the Tribunal. If they do not, the consequence under rule 8(2)(a) is mandatory. Background 4. The material factual background is largely uncontroversial.

5. In February 2015, HMRC imposed a civil penalty upon the Appellant. That penalty was challenged before this Tribunal ( Solar Power PV Limited v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 0400 (TC) ) and subsequently appealed to the Upper Tribunal (UT/2016/0189). Those challenges were unsuccessful. The liability thereby became final.

6. Payments were made over time towards discharging that liability. A balance remained outstanding.

7. In October 2024, HMRC indicated that enforcement action might be pursued including the presentation of a winding-up petition.

8. In May 2025, such a petition was in fact presented. Shortly thereafter the Appellant made substantial payments and discharged the remaining balance. The petition was then withdrawn.

9. In October 2025, the Appellant commenced the present proceedings, seeking repayment broadly equivalent to the balance which had been paid. Appellant’s position 10. The Appellant’s position is set out in its written response submitted on 17 April 2026.

11. The Appellant contends that the penalty imposed in 2015 fell to be treated as a civil monetary penalty under Schedule 24 to the Finance Act 2007 and that its recovery was subject to the Limitation Act 1980 .

12. It contends that, by the time HMRC pursued enforcement, the liability had become time barred. It is said that HMRC nonetheless pursued recovery and did so by mischaracterising the liability as one arising under the Value Added Tax Act 1994 .

13. The Appellant further alleges that the presentation of the winding up petition was wrongful and that it was compelled to make payment in circumstances where the debt was not lawfully recoverable.

14. It contends that HMRC’s conduct amounted to negligent misrepresentation and was not fair or just.

15. The Appellant submits that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to examine those matters and to order repayment of the sum in question.

16. It relies, in this context, upon the overriding objective and also upon the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Cox v Adecco UKEAT/0339/19/AT (“ Cox v Adecco ”) which is said to demonstrate that the Tribunal should not strike out the claim without properly identifying its nature. HMRC’s Position 17. HMRC submit that the proceedings fall outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

18. They submit that the Appellant is not appealing against any decision within the statutory appeal framework. Rather, the Appellant seeks to challenge a historic liability and the steps taken to enforce it.

19. HMRC contend that questions of limitation, misrepresentation and enforcement fall outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and that the proceedings must therefore be struck out.

20. They further submit that the Appellant’s reliance upon Cox v Adecco is misplaced. They observe that the case concerns strike out for lack of reasonable prospects of success, not jurisdiction, that it arises under a different procedural code and that it is not binding upon this Tribunal. Discussion 21. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is wholly statutory. It has no inherent or general jurisdiction. It may determine only such matters as Parliament has conferred upon it.

22. In the field of VAT, that jurisdiction arises principally under section 83 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 which provides for appeals against specified decisions of HMRC. More broadly, the Tribunal’s function is appellate. It determines appeals against decisions. It does not exercise a supervisory or corrective jurisdiction over HMRC at large.

23. Rule 8(2)(a) reflects that structure. It requires the Tribunal to strike out proceedings where it does not have jurisdiction. The Rule is expressed in mandatory terms. Where jurisdiction is absent, the Tribunal cannot proceed to consider the merits of the case, however strongly they may be put.

24. It follows that the first task is to identify what, in substance, the Appellant’s claim is. It is not sufficient to rely upon labels. It is necessary to understand what the Appellant is asking the Tribunal to determine.

25. I have approached that exercise with appropriate care. I have considered the Notice of Appeal and the Appellant’s written response in full. I have taken the Appellant’s case at its highest.

26. When that is done, the character of the proceedings becomes clear. The Appellant is not, in substance, appealing against a decision refusing repayment of VAT or any other statutory decision within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. No such decision has been identified and none has been produced.

27. What the Appellant seeks to do is to assert that the underlying liability was no longer enforceable, that HMRC wrongly pursued it, that it did so by mischaracterising the nature of the debt and that, as a consequence, monies paid should be repaid.

28. That is, in substance, a challenge to the enforceability of a liability and to the lawfulness of steps taken to recover it.

29. Once the proceedings are so characterised, the jurisdictional difficulty becomes apparent.

30. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine whether a debt is recoverable having regard to the Limitation Act 1980 in circumstances where that issue arises solely in the context of enforcement and not as part of an appeal against an appealable decision within its statutory jurisdiction.

31. Nor does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the propriety of insolvency proceedings brought in the High Court or to determine whether it was lawful or appropriate for HMRC to present a winding up petition.

32. Similarly, the allegation of negligent misrepresentation does not engage the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Tribunal does not entertain freestanding claims in tort or claims for restitution arising out of alleged misrepresentation. Those are matters for courts of general jurisdiction.

33. Nor can the Appellant bring its claim within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction by characterising it as a claim for recovery of money paid under a mistake or in consequence of wrongful conduct. Such claims, whether framed in misrepresentation or restitution, are not within the statutory jurisdiction conferred upon this Tribunal.

34. The Appellant also places reliance upon the overriding objective and upon what is said to be a requirement that HMRC act fairly. That submission cannot assist. The overriding objective governs the manner in which the Tribunal exercises powers which it already has. It does not confer jurisdiction in respect of matters which fall outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

35. I have also considered whether the claim might nonetheless be brought within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by characterising it as an appeal in respect of a repayment. In my judgment that is not possible. Jurisdiction to determine repayment disputes arises only where there is a statutory decision giving rise to a right of appeal. No such decision has been identified here. The absence of the review conclusion letter referred to in the Notice of Appeal underscores that point. More fundamentally, the Appellant’s case does not depend upon the terms of any decision. It is directed instead to the underlying liability and the conduct of HMRC in enforcing it 36. Even if it were assumed that a repayment claim had been made and refused, the Appellant’s case does not challenge the correctness of such a decision within the statutory framework. Rather, it proceeds upon the basis that the underlying liability was not enforceable and that monies were obtained unlawfully. Those are not matters which the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine within a statutory repayment appeal.

37. The present proceedings also have the character of a collateral challenge to a liability which has already been finally determined. That liability was the subject of earlier litigation before this Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal. The Appellant cannot, by reframing its complaint in terms of limitation, misrepresentation or unfairness in enforcement, reopen or undermine a liability which has been finally determined. To permit such a challenge would be inconsistent with the finality of litigation and falls outside the jurisdiction of this Tribunal.

38. I turn then to the Appellant’s reliance upon Cox v Adecco . I accept that the case emphasises the importance of identifying the nature of a claim before striking it out on the ground that it has no reasonable prospect of success. That is an important principle of procedural fairness.

39. However, the context in which that principle arises is materially different. Cox v Adecco concerns the exercise of a discretionary power to strike out a claim on its merits. The present case concerns a mandatory strike out for want of jurisdiction. The Tribunal is not here assessing whether the Appellant’s case is strong or weak. It is determining whether it has the power to entertain it at all.

40. In any event, the principle relied upon has been applied. I have not proceeded on the basis of assumption. I have identified the substance of the Appellant’s case by reference to its own formulation of its claim. There is no lack of clarity which would prevent the Tribunal from determining the jurisdictional issue.

41. For completeness, I accept HMRC’s submission that Cox v Adecco was decided under a different procedural regime and is not binding upon this Tribunal. Whilst it may be of persuasive value in an appropriate case, it does not alter the statutory limits of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

42. Standing back, I am satisfied that all of the Appellant’s arguments have been considered. Those arguments, taken at their highest, raise issues of limitation, alleged misrepresentation, and the propriety of enforcement action. They do not identify an appealable decision nor do they engage any statutory head of jurisdiction of this Tribunal.

43. The Appellant may or may not have remedies in another forum. That is not a matter for this Tribunal. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction has been limited by Parliament and those limits must be respected. Conclusion 44. The proceedings are not an appeal against an appealable decision. They constitute a collateral challenge to a liability and to enforcement action. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine such matters and Rule 8(2)(a) is therefore engaged.

45. HMRC’s application is granted and the proceedings are struck out for lack of jurisdiction. Right to apply for permission to appeal 46. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 24 June 2026