Mobile Home on Property: Is it Land or a Chattel for Stamp Duty Land Tax Relief?

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 00997 (TC) Case Number: TC 09942 FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL TAX CHAMBER Hybrid hearing – Taylor House with Appellant attending remotely Appeal reference: TC/2024/06236 Closure Notices – Jurisdiction – Multiple Dwellings Relief – Stamp Duty Land Tax – whether part of “land” or “chattel” Heard on: 7 May 2026 Judgment date: 02 July 2026 Before TRIBUNAL JUDGE ROSA PETTIFER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HUGO HOLMES TRIBUNAL MEMBER DR COLIN BOYD Between [APPELLANT] [APPELLANT] Appellants and THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS Respondents Representation: For the Appellants: [APPELLANT], representing himself and [APPELLANT] For the Respondents: Ms Gemma Truelove, litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office DECISION Introduction 1. This case concerns the availability of Multiple Dwellings Relief (“MDR”) from Stamp Duty Land Tax (“SDLT”). The effect of MDR is to lower the effective rate of SDLT by splitting the chargeable consideration among the number of dwellings which are the subject matter of a land transaction.

2. The Appellants purchased a house and surrounding land in East Sussex (the “Property”) on 12 April 2023 for £1,010,000, plus £850 in respect of the Property’s contents. They submitted an SDLT return on the same day (the “Return”) on the basis that £42,250 in SDLT was payable. On 5 July 2023 they applied to amend the Return applying MDR. On 26 July 2023 HMRC requested copies of the contract for the transaction and the TR1 form. These were provided on 2 August 2023. The Appellants received a refund of SDLT of £16,750.

3. HMRC opened an enquiry into the Return and issued a closure notice on 27 May 2024. This concluded that MDR was not available and so the Appellants would need to repay the £16,750 plus interest.

4. This case concerns a unit (the “Unit”) on the site of the Property and whether it meets the conditions for MDR to apply to the transaction. The parties have referred to this variously as an “annex”, “caravan” and “mobile home”.

5. The Property consists of a detached five-bedroom country house, various open spaces, and a detached double garage. The status of the Unit, and whether it forms part of the Property’s land, is a key point of contention in this appeal.

6. We are grateful for the clear submissions, both written and oral, provided by [APPELLANT] and Ms Truelove. However, we have not found it necessary to refer to every argument advanced or all the authorities cited in reaching our conclusions.

7. For the reasons given later in this decision, it is our view that MDR is not available because the Unit does not constitute land. However, we accept that the purchase price for the Property included payment for the Unit. Consequently, the SDLT due will need adjustment to remove the value of the Unit from the chargeable consideration.

8. We understand that the enquiry and subsequent appeal process have been a challenging and, at times, distressing experience for [APPELLANT]. This case concerned different interpretations of the facts and law between the Appellants and HMRC. Our finding for HMRC purely reflects our decision on those issues. There was no suggestion by HMRC nor does this decision reflect that the Appellants acted improperly in any way. They made a claim in the genuine belief that MDR would apply. issues and burden of proof 9. The fundamental issue between the parties is whether the Appellants are entitled to MDR in relation to the Unit. This raises two questions: (1) Whether the Unit is a “chattel” or counts as part of the land and so a “chargeable interest” for MDR purposes under Schedule 6B paragraphs 2(5) and s.48(1) Finance Act 2003 ; and (2) Whether the Unit is suitable for use as a single dwelling under Schedule 6B, paragraph 7(2) Finance Act 2003 .

10. The burden of proof on point (1) varies depending on whether the Unit is resting on its own weight or it is attached to the land in another way. If it rests on its own weight, the burden is on the Appellants to show that it is part of the land. If it is attached in another way, the burden is on HMRC to show it is a chattel. The burden of proof is on the Appellants in relation to point (2). The standard of proof for both points is on the balance of probabilities.

11. There is also a procedural question around HMRC’s ability to introduce the issue of whether the Unit constitutes a “chargeable interest” argument during the litigation. We refer to this as the chattel vs. land argument. outline of the parties’ positions 12. The Appellants’ position can be summarised as follows. (1) HMRC should not be allowed to introduce the “chattel” vs. land argument in the litigation as it was not part of their enquiry into the Return. (2) If they can raise this argument, then the Unit is part of the land, not a chattel. Removing it would damage the Unit. It would also require damage to the land, particularly felling the trees that have grown around the Unit. There is planning permission to have the Unit on the Property for residential purposes. (3) The only challenge HMRC has made on suitability for use as a single dwelling relates to privacy. There is sufficient privacy for anyone living in the Unit and the main house, even if the inhabitants did not know each other.

13. HMRC’s position can be summarised as follows. (1) It is open to HMRC to use new arguments during a litigation as long as they relate to the same conclusion in the enquiry into the Return. The conclusion of the enquiry into the Return was that MDR is not available. (2) MDR is only available for “chargeable interests”. That includes structures that are part of the land. The Unit is a chattel, not part of the land. Therefore MDR is not available. (3) It is possible to remove the Unit with the appropriate equipment without damaging it or the land significantly. The planning permission is for a caravan, not a permanent structure. Therefore the Unit is a “chattel”. (4) If the Unit is part of the land, it does not have sufficient privacy to be suitable for use as a single dwelling. the facts Introductory points 14. The Tribunal heard oral evidence from [APPELLANT] who was cross-examined. [APPELLANT] answered questions in a straightforward manner. We found [APPELLANT] to be honest and credible. Although we have reached different conclusions from those advanced by [APPELLANT] in certain respects, we accept that he genuinely held the views he expressed in his evidence.

15. We set out some findings of fact in the 'Findings of fact’ part of our decision. Although where it is clearer to do so we make some in other sections of our decision. A significant proportion of our findings of fact are from the documents supplied or the parts of [APPELLANT]’s evidence that was unchallenged. Consequently, many of them require no discussion as they were not in dispute. Where they were in dispute or require further discussion, we provide the reasons for our findings below. Therefore, generally we incorporate the relevant evidence in our findings rather than setting it out separately.

16. In addition to [APPELLANT]’s evidence we considered particularly the following documentary evidence: (1) The Appellants’ photos of the Unit, the house and the surrounding grounds; (2) Photos from the Zoopla listing when the Appellants purchased the Property; (3) A grant of planning permission dated 19 July 2002 and the associated application; and (4) A hand-drawn plan of the Property (drawn by previous owners) showing supplies to the Unit, labelled “TEMP SUPPLIES TO MOBILE. ELECTRICITY + WATER”. Findings of fact 17. The Unit is a flat-roofed metal structure with glass windows and doors, most of which are transparent. It does not have a towbar or wheels. It appears to be a static mobile home or caravan that would need to sit on a wheeled platform to be towed. The Unit is clearly self-contained. 18. [APPELLANT]’s photos also showed the interior of the Unit. They show: a bedroom with a double bed; a living/dining room which contains a hob, an oven, a sink, a microwave, what appears to be a washing machine, a place for sitting and sufficient further room for a drum kit; and a bathroom with a toilet, a sink, a shower and a frosted window.

19. The Unit is “properly plumbed in” rather than having a hose that one could unplug. The electricity and drainage are similarly connected. The points of connection are not visible on the photos provided.

20. The Unit rests on concrete pillars. Its only other connections to the land are the utilities pipes and cables. The photos mentioned at paragraph ‎16(1) above showed a fence with a gate on the driveway leading to the Unit on one side and the house on the other. The Appellants added this fence during their ownership. Legislation – sdlt and mdr 21. The legislative framework for SDLT is largely contained in the Finance Act 2003 (" FA 2003 "). Unless otherwise stated, references to sections and schedules are to FA 2003. The following are directly relevant to this appeal.

22. Section 42(1) provides that SDLT is chargeable on “land transactions”.

23. Section 43(1) defines land transactions as “any acquisition of a chargeable interest”.

24. Section 48(1) defines “chargeable interest” by reference to “an estate, interest, right or power in or over land”.

25. Schedule 6B contains the provisions for MDR, and paragraph 2 states in relevant part as follows: (1) This Schedule applies to a chargeable transaction… (2) A transaction is within this sub-paragraph if its main subject-matter consists of— (a) an interest in at least two dwellings, or (b) an interest in at least two dwellings and other property… (5) A reference in this Schedule to an interest in a dwelling is to any chargeable interest in or over a dwelling.

26. Paragraph 7 defines 'What counts as a dwelling', and sub-para 7(2) states: (2) A building or part of a building counts as a dwelling if— (a) it is used or suitable for use as a single dwelling, or (b) it is in the process of being constructed or adapted for such use. Procedural issue – admissibility of argument whether chattel or land 27. During the litigation, HMRC’s primary argument has been that the Unit is a chattel and not part of the land. On that basis, they argued it does not count as a “chargeable interest” and so cannot count as a dwelling pursuant to paragraph 2(5) Schedule 6B. Therefore, they argued that the transaction on 12 April 2023 only concerned one dwelling for the purposes of MDR. Part of HMRC’s reasoning for the Unit being a chattel was their view that it can be removed intact i.e. it is mobile.

28. This argument was not raised during the enquiry. HMRC’s closure notice states that the Unit is “not moveable”. A review conclusion letter dated 4 July 2024 said the same. [APPELLANT] challenged HMRC’s ability to change its position on this point in the litigation.

29. The Tribunal heard submissions on this issue during the hearing. HMRC cited Clark v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2020] EWCA Civ 204 at [106]: The correct approach was in my judgment that stated by Kitchin LJ (as he then was) in the  Fidex  case at [45], in the context of an appeal from a closure notice: "In my judgment the principles to be applied are those set out by Henderson J [ in the Tower MCashback case, at first instance ] as approved by and elaborated upon by the Supreme Court. So far as material to this appeal, they may be summarised in the following propositions: (i) The scope and subject matter of an appeal are defined by the conclusions stated in the closure notice and by the amendments required to give effect to those conclusions. (ii) What matters are the conclusions set out in the closure notice, not the process of reasoning by which HMRC reached those conclusions. (iii) The closure notice must be read in context in order properly to understand its meaning. (iv) Subject always to the requirements of fairness and proper case management, HMRC can advance new arguments before the FTT to support the conclusions set out in the closure notice.” 30. HMRC argued that the “conclusion” of the closure notice was that MDR did not apply. Their position is that there are two subtopics in their reasons for this conclusion: (1) Whether the Unit formed part of the land; and (2) Whether the Unit is suitable for use as a dwelling.

31. HMRC regarded these as reasons for the conclusion. They accepted that the closure notice’s reasoning only addressed the second reason. 32. [APPELLANT]’s submissions on this point questioned the fairness of letting HMRC change their argument after closing the enquiry.

33. First, applying the principles from Clark and Fidex noted above, particularly [45] (i) and (iv) the Tribunal must consider what we regard as the conclusion of the closure notice. We note that the enquiry into the Return concerned its amendment. The closure notice explicitly states that it does not accept that amendment and so disallows the claim for MDR. In our view, this is the conclusion – rejection of the amendment introducing MDR. This amounts to a conclusion that MDR is not available. Further, this conclusion entails HMRC’s assertions that (1) the Unit is not part of the land and (2) it would not be suitable for occupation as a single dwelling. The legislation set out at paragraphs ‎21 – 26 above shows that the question of whether the Unit is part of the land is a necessary consideration in any analysis of whether MDR is available. Therefore these issues are within the scope of the appeal before the Tribunal.

34. In any event, it is open to HMRC to raise new arguments for their conclusions during litigation. As noted in the quotation above, this is “subject…to the requirements of fairness”. The argument that the Unit is a chattel, rather than part of the land was in HMRC’s statement of case. HMRC filed the statement of case on 20 March 2025, over a year before skeleton arguments were due and the hearing took place. In our view, this gave [APPELLANT] sufficient notice of the argument to prepare for it. Therefore, we are satisfied that the requirement of fairness is met.

35. Therefore, we find that HMRC can raise the chattel vs. land argument and we consider it in this decision. Whether unit is a chattel or part of the land Discussion of the law 36. We agree with HMRC’s position, for the reasons set out above, that in order to benefit from MDR the Unit must be part of the land.

37. HMRC correctly directed the Tribunal towards land law cases to interpret the meaning of an “estate, interest right or power in or over land” in s.48 . We reviewed the following cases cited by HMRC in considering whether the Unit is part of the land. (1) Hellawell v Eastwood [1851] 155 ER 554 (“ Hellawell ”) (2) Holland v Hodgson [1872] 5 WLUK 58 (“ Holland v Hodgson ”) (3) Elitestone v Morris [1997] 1 WLR 687 (“ Elitestone ”) (4) Chelsea Yacht & Boat Company Ltd v Justin Pope [2000] 1 WLR 1941 (“ Chelsea Yacht ”) (5) Royal Parks Ltd v Bluebird Boats Ltd [2021] EWHC 2278 (TCC) (“ Royal Parks ”)

38. We have also considered Wessex Reserve Forces and Cadets Association v White [2006] 1 P. & C.R. 22 (QBD) (“ Wessex ”) which is cited in Royal Parks .

39. In Royal Parks the High Court provided this summary of the case law at [77]: (i) The structure will be treated as being part of the land if: (a) the degree of annexation is such that the structure is permanently fixed to the land and can only be removed by a process of demolition; and (b) the purpose of such annexation must be that it should form part of the land. (ii) The structure will be treated as a chattel if it sits on the land but is otherwise unattached, unless there is objective evidence that it was intended to form part of the land (iii) Where the structure is annexed to the land but potentially removable, it will be treated as being part of the land if the purpose for which it was annexed was the permanent and substantial improvement of the land; but it will be treated as a chattel if the purpose for which it was annexed was temporary or for the more complete enjoyment and use of it as a chattel. (iv) The test as to the degree and purpose of such annexation is an objective one; it is not determined by the subjective intention of the parties or any contractual arrangements between them. Throughout the rest of this decision we refer to these as “[77](i)” etc.

40. The tests in Royal Parks at [77] identify three situations to consider. (1) [77](i) This is where the structure is “permanently fixed to the land and can only be removed by a process of demolition”. For the reasons set out at paragraphs ‎66 to ‎73 below, we do consider that the Unit meets this description. Therefore the situation in [77](i) does not apply here. (2) [77] (ii) This is where a structure sits on the land, but is otherwise unattached. This situation prompts consideration of “objective evidence that it was intended” to form part of the land. In our view for the reasons set out below this is the test that is most likely to be relevant to this case. (3) [77] (iii) This is where the structure is annexed to the land, but potentially removable. In our view, this test could be an appropriate one to apply here in light of the mains connections. This prompts consideration of the “purpose” for which it was annexed.

41. If [77](ii) applies then the burden of proof is on the Appellants, if [77](iii) applies the burden of proof is on HMRC – see Holland v Hodgson at [335]: Perhaps the true rule is, that articles not otherwise attached to the land than by their own weight are not to be considered as part of the land, unless the circumstances are such as to shew that they were intended to be part of the land, the onus of shewing that they were so intended lying on those who assert that they have ceased to be chattels, and that, on the contrary, an article which is affixed to the land even slightly is to be considered as part of the land, unless the circumstances are such as to shew that it was intended all along to continue a chattel, the onus lying on those who contend that it is a chattel.

42. In our view, in practical terms, it is clear from the wording of both [77](ii) and [77](iii) in Royal Parks that we must look at how far a structure is connected to the land (whether it is there by force of gravity or some other kind of connection), and why it is on the land.

43. This approach is also borne out by looking at Hellawell and the case law examined in Royal Parks before setting out the tests at [77]. The starting point is Hellawell . Here the Court set out two considerations [emphasis added]: … first , the mode of annexation to the soil or fabric of the house, and the extent to which it is united to them, whether it can easily be removed integrè salve et commode or not without injury to itself or the fabric of the building; secondly , on the object and purpose of the annexation, whether it was for the permanent and substantial improvement of the dwelling, in the language of the civil law, perpetui usus causa, or in that of the year book, pour un profit del inheritance, or merely for a temporary purpose and the more complete enjoyment and use of it as a chattel. [In later cases the mode of annexation forms part of what is referred to as the degree of annexation.]

44. In Holland v Hodgson , the Court accepted this as a statement of “the true principles”. It provided a more streamlined test. It considered “intention” as fundamental to the question of whether something was land, and identified two circumstances that indicate that intention. These were (1) the “degree of annexation” and (2) the “object of annexation”. Elitestone applied this test, using the word “purpose” interchangeably with or alongside “object”, for example, at [699]: If one considers the object or purpose which the structure serves by being placed where it is… 45. In Elitestone , the House of Lords held that a bungalow resting on its own weight had a sufficient degree of annexation. It went on to consider the purpose , as an indicator of intention, see [693] and [698] to [699].

46. The Court in Royal Parks drew heavily on Elitestone in articulating its test at [77](ii) where structures sit on a site based on their own weight. The Court in Royal Parks at [70] cited those discussions of “intention” as requiring consideration of the “ mode of annexation”.

47. The Courts considered several questions in Royal Parks , Elitestone , Chelsea Yacht Co and Wessex when considering degree of annexation and looking to identify the purpose of annexation. We also consider those questions below and our conclusions are relevant to whether this case falls within [77](ii) or [77](iii).

48. When considering “purpose”, the parties did not provide any submissions on the relevant point in time – e.g. the moment when the Unit was brought onto the land (the time of installation), or a later point such as the time of purchase (the effective date of the transaction). In our view, it is appropriate when determining purpose to focus on the Property as it was at the time the Unit was installed. We have not identified any part of the case law we have considered that suggest it is appropriate to consider a later time. That must be because, to do otherwise would seem to retrospectively import purpose. However, in case we are wrong and so that we address [APPELLANT]’s submissions we have also considered the effective date of the transaction. Application of the law Degree of annexation – is the Unit attached to the land? 49. The bungalow in Elitestone had a main electric supply cable and drain pipes. Lord Clyde noted this at [694]. He theorised that this might be an “actual attachment” to the land. However, the parties in that case proceeded on the basis that the bungalow was not physically attached to the land, so his judgment dealt with that scenario only.

50. We have considered [APPELLANT]’s description of the mains connection and the Unit being “properly plumbed in” in light of this comment. We accept that these substantial connections were in place at the effective date of the transaction. Whether they were in place at the time of installation is unclear.

51. We were shown an undated hand-drawn plan that included the following annotation “TEMP SUPPLIES TO MOBILE. ELECTRICITY + WATER”. This could suggest that at an earlier time and therefore closer to the time of installation the supplies were temporary. This suggests they would be simpler to disconnect than proper plumbing in. We cannot say definitively from this plan whether the more substantial plumbing and electricity came later or at the time of installation.

52. In any event even without these connections, the Unit rests on concrete pillars on the land. This is similar to the bungalow in Elitestone , where the House of Lords went on to consider the purpose of annexation. The similarity is why we think that [77](ii) is the test that is most likely to be relevant to this case. Degree of annexation - would removing the Unit damage it significantly? 53. This is addressed in the discussion on purpose – see paragraph ‎66. Degree of annexation – would removing the Unit injure the land of the Property? 54. There are references in the case law to the removal of an item damaging the surroundings. This occurs in the context of looking at the degree of annexation.

55. In Hellawell , the Court considered whether cotton-spinning machines screwed into the floor were chattels or part of the land. The Court used similar wording, finding that a machine could be removed “without injury to itself or the fabric of the building”. Overall, it found they were chattels.

56. In Holland v Hodgson , looms needed to be removed from the floor. This involved removing nails from plugs or beams. The Court found that this could be done “without any serious injury” to the floors. Nevertheless, they held that the looms were part of the land. This was on the basis of the purpose of the annexation.

57. In Chelsea Yacht at [25], the Court of Appeal held: Turning firstly to the degree of annexure, it is important to bear in mind that what is required is sufficient attachment to the land so the chattel becomes part of the land itself. … The houseboat could be moved quite easily without injury to itself or the land.” 58. [APPELLANT] submitted that removing the Unit would involve damage to the land. He drew the Tribunal’s attention to the trees that have grown up around the Unit. He stated that these would need to be felled before any attempt to remove the Unit because the only way of moving the Unit was vertically.

59. HMRC submitted that the photos showed trees on one side of the Unit. Therefore, they submitted that it is still possible to remove the Unit using appropriate equipment despite the trees.

60. There was no expert evidence on the process for removing the Unit or a professional’s approach to the trees as part of that process. Therefore, the Tribunal has had to assess the facts as best it can from oral evidence and the photographs provided.

61. As with intention or purpose the parties did not make submissions about at which point in time to consider whether removing the Unit would injure the land of the Property. Again for the reasons noted above, it seems appropriate to focus on the time of installation. At the point of installation the trees would have been less developed. They do not appear to have impeded installation. We have seen nothing to suggest that they would have then prevented removal. Accordingly, our primary finding is that the Unit could have been removed at the time of installation without any injury to the trees.

62. We then turn to the position at the effective date of completion. We explain above the photographs in the bundle. It is the photographs that [APPELLANT] took more recently that show the trees the best. For the purpose of our current consideration we are satisfied that although the photographs were taken more recently the trees would not have been materially different at the effective date of completion. From the relevant photographs we can see that the trees have grown in a way that branches (though not the trunks) overhang the Unit, but do not enclose it from both sides. With respect to [APPELLANT] he did not provide a detailed explanation of why the trees would have to be felled, as opposed to pruned or tied back or even simply for the Unit to be lifted carefully through the branches, to facilitate a vertical removal of the Unit. Based on the photographs our view is that any obstacle they present to removal could be managed without felling the trees entirely. It appears to us that is because vertical removal would be possible with only tying back, pruning foliage, potentially even removing specific branches or carefully lifting the Unit through the branches. We do not regard this as sufficient to cause injury to the land. 63. [APPELLANT] also said that it would not be possible to get a large enough vehicle into position to move the Unit. Again this was clearly not an issue at the time of installation.

64. We also considered whether, at the effective date of the transaction, this meant that the removal process using such a vehicle would result in “injury” to the land of the Property. We can see from [APPELLANT]’s and the Zoopla photographs that the Property benefits from a generous driveway and front garden. Looking at both sets of photographs we are satisfied, and find as fact, that there is sufficient space to accommodate at least one or two large vehicles that would appear to us to be required to move the Unit. That is because we can see the space available relative to the Unit, the double garage and the house. For example, there is ample space for a vehicle with a flat bed large enough for the Unit to sit on and a cab to pull such a flat-bed and/or a crane. There is a fence and gate across the driveway that the vehicle would have to go down. This fence and gate might not accommo