Tax Appeal Too Late: Tribunal Refuses Permission Due to Significant Delay and Adviser Error

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 00996 (TC) Case Number: TC 09941 FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL TAX CHAMBER By remote video hearing Appeal reference: TC/2024/05954 PROCEDURE – application for permission to bring a late appeal – reliance on adviser – application refused Heard on: 26 June 2026 Judgment date: 02 July 2026 Before TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANNE FAIRPO TRIBUNAL MEMBER LESLIE BROWN Between [APPELLANT] Appellant and THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS Respondents Representation: For the Appellant: [NAME], of NHD Tax Solutions For the Respondents: Ms Lowes, litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office DECISION Introduction 1. The appellant ([APPELLANT]) seeks permission to bring a late appeal against a decision by HMRC to refuse deductions claimed by [APPELLANT] in respect of amounts paid to his wife. Chronology and findings of fact 2. We have evidence from [APPELLANT] and [NAME], his accountant, a bundle of documents and a supplementary bundle of correspondence.

3. From this, we have established the following facts: (1) 28 August 2015 and 16 January 2017: enquiries were opened into [APPELLANT]’s tax returns for 2013/14 and 2014/15. The enquiries were in respect of deductions claimed from employment income. (2) August 2016 (date unclear): the enquiries were closed, [APPELLANT]’s tax return amended and (amongst other items) an expense for “commission to PA” was allowed. (3) 31 August 2018: a enquiry was opened into [APPELLANT]’s 2016/17 tax return. HMRC concluded that there had been an error in the conclusion of the previous enquiries and that the amounts claimed were not deductible. (4) 19 January 2021: a closure notice in respect of the enquiry was issued to [APPELLANT], disallowing (inter alia) the relevant deductions claimed in 2016/17 and 2015/16. - 20 January 2021: covering letter enclosing the closure notice, explaining the decision and confirming that no penalties would be charged as the errors were considered to have occurred despite reasonable care having been taken. (5) 18 February 2021: [NAME], as agent for [APPELLANT], appealed the closure notice to HMRC on 18 February 2021. (6) 17 March 2021: HMRC issued a view of the matter letter (sent to [APPELLANT] and to [NAME]) upholding the decision in the closure notice. The view of the matter letter offered a review of the decision and stated that if “you do not want a review, you can appeal to HM Courts and Tribunal Service, but you must do this within 30 days of the date of this letter. If you choose to appeal to HM Courts and Tribunal Service, you will need to include a copy of this letter with your appeal”. The letter included links to the Tribunal website. (7) 28 March 2021: [APPELLANT] wrote to HMRC stating that he had been trying to telephone as he needed to speak to someone to set up a payment plan but wanted to ensure that the amounts outstanding were accurate. He also stated that his “situation … will be going to Tribunal”. (8) 15 April 2021: [NAME] wrote to HMRC Wealthy/Mid Sized Business Compliance office stating that “we do not see the point of an appeal and will apply under separate cover to the tribunal service”. (9) 15 April 2021: [NAME] wrote to HMRC Solicitors Office and Legal Services Appeals and Reviews stating that “we would like the tribunal services to hear this case and look forward to a response in due course”. (10) 14 August 2023: [NAME] attempted to complete an online Tribunal appeal form and printed out the resulting web pages. The form is headed: “Complete your appeal by post. On the front page it includes a box headed “What you will need to do” which then lists three steps: (a) Print out appeal details, with a link to print the details (b) Make copies of all documents that you wanted to upload, which states that “you must include … the original notice or review conclusion letter”. (c) Send everything by post to the Tribunal. The form provides the Tribunal’s address as part of the description of this step. (11) 26 July 2024: [NAME] wrote to HMRC Self Assessment asking for a copy of the 2016 enquiry conclusion letter in order to proceed with the appeal. The letter explains that [APPELLANT]’s file could not be located in the firm’s archive. That letter was accompanied by the following attachments: (a) a copy of the 19 January 2021 closure notice; (b) the 17 March 2021 view of the matter letter; (c) the two letters of 15 April 2021 from [NAME] to HMRC; (d) the pages printed from the Tribunal website on 14 August 2023; (e) a T239 authorisation form appointing [NAME] as [APPELLANT]’s representative for Tribunal proceedings, dated 3 May 2023. (12) September 2024: at least one attempt to file an appeal at the Tribunal was made and returned as it was not accompanied by a copy of the decision being challenged. [APPELLANT] telephoned HMRC to request “breathing space” in respect of debt management. (13) October 2024: [APPELLANT] made a subject access request to HMRC, later repeated when the first attempt resulted in a CD containing two audio files. (14) 11 November 2024: the notice of appeal in these proceedings was accepted by the Tribunal. Relevant law 4. There was no dispute that the time limit for appealing the decision in the view of the matter letter of 17 March 2021 was 30 days after the date of that letter, such that an appeal should have been made by 16 April 2021.

5. The parties also agreed that the approach to be taken by the Tribunal was the three stage approach set out in Martland [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) at [44]: (1) Establish the length of the delay … (2) The reason (or reasons) why the default occurred should be established. (3) The FTT can then move onto its evaluation of “all the circumstances of the case”. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission. Discussion Length of the delay 6. The view of the matter letter was issued on 17 March 2021. As the offer of a review was refused, the deadline for appealing was 16 April 2021.

7. It was not disputed that the appeal was not received by this Tribunal on 11 November 2024, 1306 days later.

8. That is, by any assessment, a serious and significant delay. Reason for the delay 9. [NAME]’s evidence was that he had attempted to appeal on behalf of [APPELLANT] on 15 April 2021 when he wrote to HMRC Solicitors Office, asking that the Tribunal services hear the case. [NAME] stated that this was in line with the process he had taken previously. As nothing further was heard, he had assumed that the matter had been put to the Tribunal by HMRC.

10. It was only when [APPELLANT] attempted to arrange a payment plan that they became aware that the matter had not been passed to the Tribunal, as HMRC required a copy of a Tribunal appeal reference.

11. They were then unable to submit an appeal as they could not locate a copy of the 2016 review conclusion letter; they attempted to request this from HMRC but the requests were not responded to within a reasonable time frame and the request for a copy of the 2016 review conclusion letter was ignored. 12. [APPELLANT] had relied upon [NAME] in good faith to deal with the Tribunal issues for him.

13. It was contended that the delays arose at least in part because HMRC did not reply to the letters of 15 April 2021 and correct [NAME]’s misunderstanding as to the position. Evaluation of all of the circumstances Whether there is a good reason for the delay 14. We find that the initial delay in this appeal arose because [NAME] did not appeal to the Tribunal but, instead, wrote to HMRC Solicitors’ Office and assumed that they would forward the information to the Tribunal service to make an appeal. His evidence was that it was not until [APPELLANT] attempted to arrange a payment plan with the debt management team that [NAME] became aware that the appeal had not been passed through to the Tribunal; no specific date for this was provided in evidence. The only evidence provided to us regarding attempts to discuss a payment plan were [APPELLANT]’s letters in late March 2021 and telephone calls to HMRC in September 2024. Efforts to appeal to the Tribunal appear to have commenced in May 2023, when [APPELLANT] signed a T239 representative authorised form. 15. [NAME]’s evidence was that he believed that the procedure for commencing an appeal was to write to HMRC Solicitors Office, because this was the procedure required on the previous occasion that he had followed on behalf of a client, some twenty years earlier and before the Tribunal was established, when appealing to the Commissioners. We take judicial note that [NAME]’s recollection as to that procedure was in any case faulty: the procedure for appealing to the Commissioners was set out in ss31 -31C TMA 1970 , as in force before 1 April 2009. That process required an appeal to the inspector or officer who had issued the decision appealed, setting out the grounds of appeal. [NAME]’s letter of 15 April 2021 was sent to HMRC Solicitors’ Office and contained no grounds of appeal.

16. The view of the matter letter sent on 17 March 2021 included details of sources of information as to the process for making appeals to this Tribunal. A cursory check of publicly available sources would have shown that appeals to this Tribunal are not commenced by writing to HMRC Solicitors’ Office. The Tribunal had been in existence for 12 years at the date at which this appeal should have been made. We do not consider that it was reasonable for [NAME] to assume that the process remained the same as he recalled it almost two decades after he had previously appealed on behalf of a client and when he was aware, given his references to the Tribunal service, that appeals were no longer made to the Commissioners.

17. No attempt was made to follow up this attempt to appeal in March 2021 for some time. [NAME]’s evidence was that it was not unusual for there to be delays in hearing from HMRC, such that it was quite usual for 6 or 7 months to pass before receiving a response.

18. Even if delays of 6 to 7 months in correspondence were usual, we would expect a reasonable person to make enquiries once that time had passed. However, there was no evidence provided to us of any action being taken until at least May 2023 when [APPELLANT] signed a T239 form, authorising [NAME] to represent him at the Tribunal. This was some 25 months after [NAME] had written to HMRC, attempting to initiate an appeal. There was no explanation for this delay.

19. The next action that we had evidence for took place on 14 August 2023, when [NAME] attempted to complete an online appeal form. This was not submitted, but pages from the appeal website were printed on that date.

20. The printed pages are from the tribunal appeal website and headed “Complete your appeal by post”. The URL (web address) indicates that these pages were displayed when there was a problem uploading a document. The pages printed advise, in a box on the front page, “what you will need to do”. The three steps set out are to: (1) print the appeal details, (2) make copies of all documents that were to be uploaded, and (3) send everything by post to the Tribunal.

21. The print of those pages was sent to HMRC in July 2024, as an attachment to a letter dated 26 July 2024. [NAME]’s explanation for the delay between the appeal form being printed in August 2023 and being sent in July 2024 was that they were trying to obtain from HMRC a copy of a review conclusion letter sent in August 2018 following the 2016 enquiry, to enable the appeal to be submitted.

22. However, the letter to HMRC of 26 July 2024, to which the printed pages were attached, states that it was being sent following a conversation with HMRC “earlier this week” which requested a copy of the review conclusion letter from 2016 in order to proceed with the appeal. The letter states that it includes samples of letters on the file to show that they were trying to progress the matter: those samples are HMRC letters from January and March 2021, the two letters of 15 April 2021, and the printout from the Tribunal appeal website. There is no earlier correspondence seeking the 2016 review conclusion letter; the attachments do not include any letters dated later than 15 April 2021.

23. Given the contents of the 26 July 2024 letter, we conclude that the 2016 review conclusion letter had not been requested before July 2024. The lack of that letter cannot, therefore, be an explanation for the delay between the appeal form being printed in August 2023 and the letter being sent to HMRC in July 2024. 24. [APPELLANT] and [NAME]’s evidence was that they believed that a copy of the 2016 review conclusion letter was required in order to bring an appeal, and that the delay arose because they were unable to obtain this from HMRC. [APPELLANT] had not retained a copy of the letter and [NAME]’s firm were unable at that time to locate in their archives the file which would have contained a copy of the letter. [NAME] believed that it would be easier for HMRC to recover and send a copy of the letter than for his firm to locate it amongst the archive of files for their 700 clients.

25. The 2016 letter was the only review conclusion letter that they were aware of. No review had been requested in respect of the 17 March 2021 view of the matter letter, although it was offered, and [NAME] had specifically written to say that they did not intend to take up the offer of a review.

26. We do not accept that seeking the 2016 review conclusion letter was a good reason for any part of the delay.

27. Whilst [NAME] and [APPELLANT] clearly believed that they needed the 2016 review conclusion letter, there was no evidence that they had applied any thought as to why an earlier review conclusion letter might be required to submit an appeal when [APPELLANT] intended to appeal the decision set out in the view of the matter letter dated 17 March 2021.

28. That letter specifically states that a copy of it should be sent with the appeal. The First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) Procedure Rules 2009 (the Tribunal Rules) state (at Rule 20(3)) that what is required is a copy of the decision being appealed (or an explanation as to why it cannot reasonably be obtained).

29. We do not consider that it was reasonable for [NAME] and [APPELLANT] to proceed on the basis of an unchecked assumption that what was required to make the appeal was a letter which they were not challenging. 30. [NAME] contended that the delay would not have arisen if HMRC had replied to the 15 April 2021 letter to Solicitors Office to explain the correct procedure for appealing. HMRC contend that they did not receive this letter.

31. We did not have sufficient evidence to reach any conclusions as to whether or not HMRC should be regarded as having received that letter. However, even: (1) if HMRC had received the 15 April 2021 letter, and (2) if it should be regarded as appropriate for HMRC to send a letter explaining the appeal process (in respect of which we express no view as we did not have detailed submissions and it is not necessary so to do) we consider that the contents of that letter - noting that it was sent some 12 years after the Tribunal Rules came into effect - would not, in our view, be interpreted as an attempt to make an appeal to which such a response might be appropriate. The letter effectively advises that [APPELLANT] wishes to appeal to the Tribunal, setting out that information only. It contains no grounds of appeal. We do not consider that, over a decade after the Tribunal came into existence, a recipient of that letter at HMRC would take the view that the letter was doing anything other than inform them that the taxpayer would make an appeal to the Tribunal. We do not agree that such recipient would consider that it was an attempt to invoke the procedure that applied when making an appeal to the Commissioners before this Tribunal was established.

32. Summarising the above, we do not consider that there was a good reason for the delay: (1) April 2021 to May 2023: a reasonable person would not have waited over two years before taking further action when no response was received; we also consider that a reasonable person would have checked the procedure for appealing to this Tribunal and not assumed that the procedure had not changed when the Tribunal was introduced. The letter to HMRC would not have alerted them to the fact that [NAME] did not understand the appeal process. (2) May 2023 to August 2023: no explanation was given as to why the Tribunal appeal form (at a minimum) was not engaged with for three months following receipt of authorisation from the appellant. (3) August 2023 to July 2024: the explanation that the 2016 review conclusion letter was awaited is not made out: there was no evidence that the letter had been sought earlier. There was no other explanation for this delay. (4) July 2024 to November 2024: the belief that the 2016 review conclusion letter was required in order to appeal was not, in our view, reasonably held and does not amount to a good reason for the delay. Reliance on an adviser 33. [APPELLANT] contended that he was not an expert in tax and had relied upon [NAME] to handle his tax affairs: if [NAME] had not followed correct procedure or otherwise failed to submit an appeal, this was outside [APPELLANT]’s control and it would not be fair to penalise him for any failures by his agent. 34. [APPELLANT]’s evidence was that he had “only latterly become aware” of the multiple failed attempts by [NAME] to appeal the matter to the Tribunal, although his evidence was also that he had over the years personally chased [NAME], HMRC and the Tribunal service on many occasions as he was aware that the matter was not progressing.

35. The only evidence of [APPELLANT] “chasing” after the view of the matter letter in 15 March 2021 that was provided to us was: (1) HMRC SA notes showing telephone calls made in September 2024 seeking “breathing space” in respect of debt management; attempting to make a Subject Access Request in October 2024; requesting letters for “a tribunal case” (presumably this one). (2) a letter to the Tribunal of 17 March 2025 to “add [his] comments to the appeal”. 36. [APPELLANT] did not keep any records of calls to HMRC; he assumed that HMRC would log the calls. He had sent emails to HMRC; these were not included in evidence and no dates of such correspondence were provided.

37. In the hearing, [APPELLANT] stated that he had called the Tribunal 8-10 times, although he had not kept any record of any such attempts. When asked whether the Tribunal had ever advised him that he did not have a live appeal, he recalled that he had been told that there was no live appeal and that he had asked [NAME] to make sure the appeal had been dealt with. [NAME] had replied with details of a TC reference number from the Tribunal and an auto-reply message from the Tribunal showing an appeal had been submitted. [APPELLANT] stated that this was in September 2024; [NAME] explained that that appeal was subsequently returned as it was not accompanied by a copy of the decision being appealed or an explanation as to why a copy was not available.

38. There is therefore no evidence before us that [APPELLANT] was chasing HMRC or the Tribunal after the appeal deadline and before September 2024, nor any details as to his chasing [NAME]. [APPELLANT] stated that he knew nothing about tax and so had appointed [NAME] to deal with his tax affairs and relied on his assurances that all was in hand. At one point he had asked a friend who was an accountant whether he should change advisers; his friend had suggested that it would be better to continue to engage [NAME]. No date for this discussion was given. 39. [APPELLANT] contended that this was similar to employing a mechanic to fix his car; he did not expect to be required to fix the car himself. He had acted in good faith and believed that all was being dealt with correctly; it was not until November 2025, when he engaged another representative, that he fully realised the extent of [NAME]’s errors.

40. We do not agree that his reliance on [NAME] provides [APPELLANT] with a good reason for the delay. As made clear in Katib [2019] UKUT 189 (TCC) , failures by an appellant’s adviser should generally be treated as failures by the appellant. The starting point is therefore that, given the importance of meeting statutory deadlines, a failure by an agent is unlikely to be provide a good reason for the delay. 41. [APPELLANT]’s contention that it would not be fair to penalise him for the failures of his agent are not sufficient to displace that starting point: it remains open to him to pursue a claim for damages for any loss he may suffer as a result.

42. Taking [APPELLANT]’s own analogy, we do not consider that someone engaging a mechanic to fix their car is required to fix the car themselves (although we also note that this Tribunal does not require appellants to be represented and a significant majority of appellants are not represented). We do consider that such a person would not continue to rely on that mechanic when there were no signs of a repair after a number of months, let alone a number of years.

43. For the avoidance of doubt, we accept that [APPELLANT] has always wanted to appeal this HMRC decision and has latterly made attempts to obtain information by contacting the Tribunal and HMRC, including making a Subject Access Request to attempt to obtain the 2016 review conclusion letter.

44. However, a desire to appeal a decision must be accompanied by timely action. In this case, the actions taken were not timely: [APPELLANT]’s engagement with the Tribunal and HMRC came over three years after the deadline for appealing, and there is no evidence of his engaging with [NAME] following the appeal deadline in April 2021 before he signed the T239 authorisation form in August 2023. Given the evidence before us, we do not consider that it is appropriate to depart from the starting point set out in Katib : [APPELLANT]’s reliance on [NAME] does not provide [APPELLANT] with a good reason for the delay. Prejudice to the parties 45. It was contended that it would be unfair to deny [APPELLANT] the ability to appeal, given that he had acted reasonably and had actively sought to resolve the issue throughout. Clearly, if we do not grant permission, [APPELLANT] will be unable to pursue the appeal and will be required to pay the disputed tax. This is the inevitable consequence of a failure to appeal in time. There was no contention that any other consequences might apply in this case.

46. As noted in Martland at [46], the Tribunal can have regard to any obvious strengths or weaknesses of an appellant’s case - without conducting a mini-trial - as part of the consideration of prejudice to the parties, in that there may be prejudice if an appellant were to lose the opportunity to put forward a very strong case.

47. The grounds of appeal set out in [APPELLANT]’s notice of appeal were that he had relied upon a previous enquiry decision by HMRC which had allowed his deduction for the same type of expense incurred in earlier years. In his appeal to HMRC, he contended that as such, he had every right to continue to make the claims. This is, in effect, a legitimate expectation argument which this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider in the context of the refusal to allow a claim for deductions.

48. In the hearing, [NAME] stated that - if permission were to be given - an application would be made to amend the grounds of appeal. This would be to argue that the payments to [APPELLANT]’s wife were made wholly, exclusively and necessarily because [APPELLANT] required the assistance of a PA in order to achieve a particular level of sales, as the substantial majority of his employment income was from sales commissions. There was no indication that the engagement of a PA was anything other than a personal choice made by [APPELLANT] in trying to maximise his income. HMRC contended that this did not meet the “necessarily” requirement for deduction.

49. Considering the parties’ submissions as to merit, we find that there is no obviously strong merit to [APPELLANT]’s substantive appeal, even considering the potential amendments that might be made to the grounds of appeal. As such, we attach little weight to these in balancing the circumstances.

50. HMRC contended that the importance of finality was well established, citing Martland at [34]. [NAME] argued that HMRC would get finality if they won the eventual appeal, should permission be granted, and would be compensated for any delay in achieving finality by interest on the amounts in dispute. [NAME]’s submission was surprising, as the logical inference of his argument is that statutory deadlines are irrelevant as finality could be achieved, and compensated for by interest, through an appeal being heard no matter how late it might be brought.

51. We do not accept his submission on this point. The Court of Appeal in Medpro [2026] EWCA Civ 14 has recently made it clear that particular importance is to be attached, when considering applications such as these, for the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected.

52. If permission were to be granted, we accept that HMRC would suffer prejudice by being required to divert public resources from other matters in order to defend these proceedings. Other taxpayers and other Tribunal appellants would also suffer prejudice through the time and resources of HMRC and the Tribunal being diverted from their disputes in favour of this appeal. Conclusion 53. As set out in Martland , the starting point is that permission to appeal late should not be granted unless we are satisfied that, balancing all of the circumstances, permission should be granted. We note that, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Medpro [2026] EWCA Civ 14 , we should take into account the particular importance of the need for statutory time limits to be respected.

54. Overall, considering all of the evidence and submissions before us, we consider that the serious delay in appealing and the lack of good reasons for the delay weigh significantly against granting permission and outweigh any prejudice to [APPELLANT] that might arise.

55. Balancing all of the circumstances of the case, we are not satisfied that permission to appeal out of time should be granted. The appeal is therefore dismissed. Right to apply for permission to appeal 56. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 02 July 2026