When a 'Small Number' Becomes Personal Data: FOIA Request for Care Service Figures Dismissed
📌 Em resumo
The First-tier Tribunal recently decided that asking for a very specific number of people using a particular care service could reveal personal information, even if it's just a number. The court agreed with the Information Commissioner that giving out the exact figure would make it too easy to identify individuals, especially in a small group and a sensitive setting. This means that even seemingly statistical requests can be refused if they risk breaching people's privacy rights under data protection laws.
⚖️ Tese Jurídica
Disclosure of a precise statistical figure concerning a very small cohort can constitute personal data, and its release may be unlawful under section 40(2) FOIA if it enables identification of individuals, particularly in sensitive contexts, and fails the legitimate interests test under UK GDPR Article 6(1)(f).
📖 O que diz a lei
This rule allows public bodies to refuse to release information if it is personal data about someone other than the person asking for it, and if releasing it would be unlawful under data protection laws. In this case, it was used to refuse the request because the precise number was deemed personal data and its release would be unlawful.
Ver o texto da lei
Personal information. 40 1 Any information to which a request for information relates is exempt information if it constitutes personal data of which the applicant is the data subject. 2 Any information to which a request for information relates is also exempt information if— a it constitutes personal data which does not fall within subsection (1), and b the first, second or third condition below is satisfied. 3A The first condition is that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under this Act— a would contravene any of the data protection principles, or b wo…
This section helps define what 'personal data' means in UK law. It clarifies that information is personal data if it relates to an identified or identifiable living individual. The Tribunal used this definition to decide that the precise statistical figure, even though a number, could be personal data in this specific context.
Ver o texto da lei
Terms relating to the processing of personal data 3 1 This section defines some terms used in this Act. 2 “ Personal data ” means any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual (subject to subsection (14)(c)). 3 “ Identifiable living individual ” means a living individual who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to— a an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data or an online identifier, or b one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of…
This is a fundamental principle of data protection, stating that all processing of personal data must be lawful, fair, and transparent. It means that organisations must have a valid legal reason to handle personal information and be open about how they use it.
This rule provides one of the legal reasons for processing personal data, specifically when it's necessary for the 'legitimate interests' of the organisation, unless those interests are overridden by the individual's rights and freedoms. In this case, the Tribunal found that the public interest in transparency did not outweigh the privacy rights of the individuals, so releasing the data under this basis would be unlawful.
Explicação em linguagem simples — não substitui orientação de um advogado.
📖 Resumo técnico
The First-tier Tribunal dismissed an appeal against the Information Commissioner's decision, upholding that disclosure of a precise statistical figure for a small cohort constituted personal data and would be unlawful under FOIA s.40(2) due to identifiability and lack of legitimate interest.
📜 Ementa Documento oficial
The First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber), before Judge Brian Kennedy KC, dismissed an appeal against the Information Commissioner's decision. The appellant sought the precise number of individuals from a specific area attending a particular respite service. The public authority had provided an anonymised figure of 'five or less', citing identification risks. The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's conclusion that the precise number constituted personal data under section 40(2) FOIA, as disclosure would likely lead to identification within a small, locally understood cohort, especially in a sensitive care setting. It found that while there was a general legitimate interest in transparency, the specific request was personal, and the incremental value of the precise number was outweighed by the significant intrusion into the data subjects' privacy rights, thus failing the Article 6(1)(f) legitimate interests test.
📚 Inteiro teor Documento oficial
NCN: [2026] UKFTT 00957 (GRC) Appeal Number: FT/EA/2026/0011 First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) Information Rights Heard on: 24 June 2026. Decision given on: 26 June 2026. Before Judge Brian Kennedy KC With Specialist Panel members Miriam Scott and Kate Grimley Evans. Between: [APPELLANT] Appellant and The Information Commissioner Respondent Decision: The appeal is Dismissed. REASONS Introduction:
1. Where a seemingly statistical request concerns a very small cohort which, on the evidence, in substance comprises a small number by which disclosure of the precise figure can, and will in this case, constitute disclosure of personal data and will ordinarily be unlawful under section 40(2) FOIA. Background:
2. This is an appeal brought by the Appellant against the impugned Decision Notice (“DN”) of the Information Commissioner (“Commissioner”) dated 18 December 2025.
3. The underlying request, made on 14 November 2024, sought the number of persons residing in Carmarthenshire who attended Bryn Siriol Respite Service in Aberystwyth, the public authority (“PA”).
4. The PA responded on 2 January 2025, providing an anonymised figure of “ five or less ”, explaining that the data had been aggregated due to the risk of identification arising from low numbers.
5. The Appellant sought the precise number. Following a complaint from the Appellant, the Commissioner concluded that the PA was entitled to withhold the exact number under section 40(2) FOIA but had breached section 17 in failing to provide a timely refusal notice.
6. The present appeal challenges the Commissioner’s substantive conclusion in the DN. Chronology:
7. The material chronology is not in dispute and may be summarised as follows: (a) 14 November 2024 – FOIA request submitted. (b) 2 January 2025 – Response issued (“five or less”). (c) 10 January 2025 – Appellant seeks internal review and exact number. (d) 4 April 2025 – Complaint made to the Commissioner. (e) 18 December 2025 – DN issued. (f) 8 January 2026 – Appeal lodged. The Issues:
8. The Tribunal must determine, on a de novo basis, whether the Commissioner’s conclusion in the impugned DN under section 40(2) FOIA was correct.
9. The issues arising are: (1) Whether the withheld information (the precise number) constitutes personal data. (2) If so, whether disclosure would contravene Article 5(1)(a) UK GDPR, in particular by failing the Article 6(1)(f) legitimate interests’ test. (3) The role of identifiability, including application of the “motivated intruder” approach. (4) The balance between transparency and the rights and freedoms of the data subject. The Relevant Law:
10. Section 40(2) FOIA exempts from disclosure information which is the personal data of a third party where disclosure would contravene a data protection principle. 11. “Personal data” is defined in section 3(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 as information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual.
12. The relevant data protection principle is Article 5(1)(a) UK GDPR: that processing must be lawful, fair and transparent.
13. Lawfulness falls to be assessed by reference to Article 6(1), in this case Article 6(1)(f), requiring: (i) a legitimate interest, (ii) necessity and (iii) a balancing exercise between that interest and the data subject’s rights.
14. In assessing identifiability, the Tribunal adopts the “motivated intruder” approach as applied by the Commissioner. Discussion and Findings: a) Whether the information is personal data;
15. The Tribunal is satisfied that the requested information constitutes personal data relating to Data Subjects.
16. While the withheld information is numerical in form, the question is whether disclosure of the precise number would enable identification, directly or indirectly, of a living individual.
17. Small numbers increase the risk of identification but are not determinative; the assessment is fact-sensitive and requires a realistic, not merely theoretical, route to identification.
18. The Tribunal has had regard to both open and closed evidence.
19. The closed material establishes that in fact the relevant cohort is effectively small as there was a low number meeting the criteria of the request.
20. Disclosure of the precise number could therefore confirm the identity of an individual by elimination within a small and locally understood cohort.
21. The context of a specialised care setting, involving service users, families and staff with existing knowledge, materially increases the likelihood of identification.
22. Applying the motivated intruder approach, the Tribunal is satisfied that identification would be reasonably likely.
23. The Tribunal are unanimous in finding the withheld information therefore constitutes personal data. b) Lawfulness and the legitimate interests test 24. The Tribunal accept that there is a general legitimate interest in transparency in relation to the allocation of publicly funded care services.
25. However, the Appellant’s interest is (on the evidence) a personal one—namely whether a particular individual, is the sole service user from Carmarthenshire. Necessity:
26. The Tribunal accepts that disclosure of “five or less” already provides a measure of transparency.
27. The incremental value of disclosing the precise number is limited.
28. The Tribunal is not satisfied that disclosure of the exact number is necessary to meet the legitimate interest relied upon. Balancing exercise:
29. The balancing exercise in this case is not a finely poised one.
30. The information concerns the private life of vulnerable individuals receiving care in a specialist setting. The closed material demonstrates that disclosure of the precise number would, in reality, identify an individual within a small and locally understood cohort.
31. The intrusion into the data subject’s rights would therefore be both direct and foreseeable. The risk is real rather than speculative and includes the possibility of unwanted attention, stigma or targeting in a sensitive and capacity-constrained service context.
32. By contrast, the legitimate interest in further disclosure is modest. The information already disclosed (“five or less”) provides a meaningful degree of transparency.
33. Disclosure of the precise number would add little to public understanding but would materially interfere with data subjects rights.
34. The balance therefore falls decisively against disclosure. There is no lawful basis under Article 6(1)(f), and disclosure would be unlawful within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a). Conclusion:
35. The Tribunal has considered the evidence and the applicable law afresh, as required by its jurisdiction.
36. Notwithstanding that this is a de novo determination, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Commissioner’s reasoning is cogent and accords with the evidence before it. There is no error of Law in the outcome, exercise of discretion or reasoning in the DN. The Tribunal has reached the same conclusion for its own reasons.
37. The Tribunal has taken into account the closed material, which materially strengthens the conclusion that the withheld information is, in substance, personal data capable of identifying an individual, and that disclosure would be unlawful.
38. In all the circumstances and on the evidence before us and applying appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a reasoned and fact-sensitive regulatory decision, the Tribunal is satisfied that no basis arises to depart from the Commissioner’s conclusion. We find no error of Law in the DN and therefore find the appeal must fail. Decision:
39. The appeal is dismissed. Brian Kennedy KC 25 June 2026.
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Panorama deste acervo — não é previsão do resultado do seu caso.
⚖️ O que costuma pesar em casos assim
✅ Costuma ser acolhido
- The public authority's refusal letter did not fully explain the right to appeal.
- The public authority did not properly consider changes or limits to a request it called troublesome.
❌ Costuma ser rejeitado
- The information request was part of a series of connected requests, making it troublesome.
- The public authority had already done enough to search for the information.
- The public authority did not actually hold the information requested.
- The public interest in keeping information secret was greater than the public interest in knowing if it existed.
- The person making the appeal failed to follow the court's instructions.
Padrões observados nos casos semelhantes deste acervo — cada processo é único.
❓ Perguntas frequentes
What did this decision decide?
This decision confirmed that a public authority was right to refuse to give an exact number of people using a specific care service, because providing that number would likely reveal personal information about those individuals.
Who was involved?
The case involved an individual who made a Freedom of Information request, and the Information Commissioner, who is responsible for upholding information rights. A public authority that provided care services was also involved in the original request.
How did the court decide, and why?
The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal. It decided that the precise number of people, even though it was just a statistic, counted as 'personal data' because it was a very small group. Releasing the exact number would make it reasonably likely for people to identify individuals, especially given the sensitive nature of the care service and local knowledge.
Which laws or rules were applied?
The main laws applied were Section 40(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, which deals with personal data, and parts of the UK General Data Protection Regulation (UK GDPR), specifically Article 5(1)(a) on lawful processing and Article 6(1)(f) on legitimate interests.
What was the argument that mattered most?
The most important argument was whether the precise number of service users, in a very small group, could be used to identify individuals. The court used the 'motivated intruder' approach to assess if someone trying to identify individuals would reasonably succeed, concluding that they would.
Was the decision for or against the person who brought the case?
The decision was against the person who brought the case (the appellant), as their appeal was dismissed.
What does this mean for someone in a similar situation?
If you are requesting information that involves very small numbers of people, especially in sensitive contexts like health or social care, public authorities may be able to withhold precise figures to protect individuals' privacy, even if the request seems purely statistical.
What evidence or documents mattered?
The Tribunal considered both open and closed (confidential) evidence. The closed material was particularly important in showing that the group of people was indeed very small and that identification would be likely.
Can a decision like this be appealed?
Decisions from the First-tier Tribunal can sometimes be appealed to the Upper Tribunal, but usually only if there's a point of law that needs to be clarified or if the Tribunal made a legal mistake.
Is it worth getting a solicitor for a case like this?
It is always advisable to seek advice from a qualified solicitor for your specific situation, as they can provide tailored guidance on the complexities of information rights and data protection law.
