When is an Information Request 'Vexatious'? Tribunal Upholds ICO's Decision

NCN: [2026] UKFTT 00990 (GRC) Case Reference: FT/EA/2024/0356 First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber Information Rights DN IC-377904-F0Q8 Grimsby Magistrates Court Heard on: 15 June 2026 Decision given on: 02 July 2026 Before TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHRIS HUGHES TRIBUNAL MEMBER DAN PALMER-DUNK TRIBUNAL MEMBER EMMA YATES Between [APPELLANT] Appellant and INFORMATION COMMISSIONER Respondent Appearances Appellant: in person Respondent: [NAME] (instructed by [NAME]) Case Information Commissioner vs Devon County Council & Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC), Decision: The appeal is Dismissed REASONS Background 1. There is a long history of contact between a [APPELLANT] and Irby upon Humber Parish Council. As well as approaching the Parish Council, [APPELLANT] has also made numerous complaints and information requests to the Information Commissioner (ICO) between 2019 and 2022, with 15 information requests (under both FOIA and data protection legislation identified on the ICO’s casework system concerned with this issue. In about 2022 the Parish Council was dissolved and after a period of years was re-instated in 2024. 2. [APPELLANT] wrote to the ICO by email on 10 February 2024 seeking information: “Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 , I am writing to request information regarding the data protection registration of Irby upon Humber Parish Council with the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) for the past five years. Specifically, I would like to request the following information:

1) Confirmation of each Irby upon Humber Parish Council data protection registration or renewal with the ICO for the past five years.

2) The dates on which Irby upon Humber Parish Council completed their data protection registration or renewal with the ICO for each of these years.

3) The sum paid by Irby upon Humber Parish Council to the ICO in respect of their data protection registration fee for each year.

4) The data protection registration number for Irby upon Humber Parish Council.” 3. The ICO responded on 7 March 2024 considered the request vexatious and refused the request under section 14(1) FOIA. It explained its concerns: Our past response to you under reference IC-160324-R2M5 laid out our rationale for refusing that request referencing the arguably obsessive nature and volume of complaints and requests regarding Irby upon Humber Parish Council (the Council). You were informed in that response that further requests relating either directly or indirectly to the Council would most likely be refused under section 14(1). I consider that much of that rationale remains relevant to this request. We are aware that the Council had been dissolved for a period and, during that time, your complaints and requests for information held by the ICO about the council diminished. While we acknowledge that since our response alluded to above you have reduced the number of complaints and information requests, it is notable that as soon as the Council reconstituted, your requests have resumed. Given the similarities between this request and your previous requests and the timing of your request, it is our view that this present request is intended to resume a campaign of disruption against the Council. With the above in mind, we remain of the view that this and like requests serve no serious purpose in terms of their wider public interest and are unlikely to resolve your apparently ongoing issues with the Council. As such we consider this simply an attempt to resume and perpetuate the drain on the time and resources of the Council, and by extension, the ICO.

4. The Appellant sought an internal review of the refusal stating: “… However, I must clarify that I have never submitted any FOI requests to the Council and thus, I am not the individual allegedly involved in the pattern of requests your organisation considers vexatious. This misunderstanding appears to have influenced your decision regarding my request. Accordingly, my request has been mistakenly associated with a purported pattern of behaviour that does not apply to me” 5. The ICO maintained its position following an internal review on 13 March 2024: “… There is little I can add to the rationale already provided to you in the original response. The ICO’s own guidance states that ‘the context and history in which a request is made will often be a major factor in determining whether the request is vexatious, and the public authority will need to consider the wider circumstances surrounding the request before making a decision as to whether section 14(1) applies. ….. In your recent email I note you informed us ‘I provide assurance that I am a different requester with no connection to the alleged pattern of requests you have deemed as vexatious.’ It is however my opinion that you are the same requester. This assessment is based on the name and address you have provided to us. There is also a common theme within your requests which I note relate to Irby upon Humber Parish Council. In summary, I can confirm your review is not upheld and I believe S.14 FOIA was correctly applied.” 6. By a decision notice of 9 August 2024 (IC-294306-K7B6) the ICO found that 21 The ICO’s view is that the request serves to express the complainant’s dissatisfaction with, and distrust of, the Parish Council and provides further means by which they can cause the Parish Council disruption. The ICO is unclear as to how the requested information would help the complainant resolve their dispute with the Parish Council and any public interest is arguably served by the information being published on the ICO’s data protection register. The ICO maintains that any wider public interest in the registration history of a small parish council is not substantial enough to justify the possible detriment it has argued.

7. The Information Commissioner concluded that section 14(1) FOIA was correctly applied to the request. Appeal 8. In the appeal (signed by [APPELLANT]) the Appellant maintained the position that he was not the requester in IC-160324-R2M5 and further “Despite being fully aware of the Appellant’s and the Requester’s personal identifiers, the ICO failed to verify the accuracy of the data and to distinguish between their information. Accordingly, the ICO incorrectly merged personal data related to both the Appellant and the Requester” .

9. In resisting the appeal the Respondent Information Commissioner on 11 October 2024 sought a direction that the Appellant and his proposed witness [NAME] provide photo identification and proof of address. This direction was refused by the tribunal.

10. By a note of 17 April 2026 the ICO set out his position in the light of these claims by [APPELLANT]: “14 If there are two individuals, the Tribunal will need to go on to consider if the 10 February 2024 was submitted by [NAME] in his own right.

15. When considering whether a request is vexatious, it is an holistic assessment. It is possible for a single, isolated, request to be vexatious or for a request to be vexatious if the request was made by someone acting in concert with another person/s. The Commissioner provides his guidance alongside this Note to assist the Tribunal 16. In this regard, the Commissioner has identified some information which he considers may be relevant to the Tribunal’s consideration of this case. The Commissioner notes that in the public domain there is documentation setting out a request to the ICO in February 2021 from a ‘[NAME]’. This request asks the ICO for information about ‘the data controller registration of Irby upon Humber Parish Council’ for previous years. The ICO complied with that request. This request bears a striking similarity to the request of 10 February 2024.

17. In all the circumstances, the Commissioner currently considers it is more likely than not that the [NAME] who made that request is the same requester who made the one under consideration in this appeal or, alternatively, that the requesters are acting in concert, or the request was made in awareness of the previous requests and context relating to Irby upon Humber Parish Council (see DN para 16, 18. When considering whether a request is vexatious, the Tribunal will of course need to factor in the value of the request. The Appellant has set out his views of its value in his grounds and other documents. For his part, the Commissioner considers the alleged value is overstated, especially in light of all the other factors in this case.” Documents 11. The Appellant neither gave evidence nor did he call his witness ([NAME]), to whom he referred as his son. The Appellant provided the tribunal with a copy of a page from his passport showing he was born in 1948 and also a bank statement. 12. [NAME] submitted a witness statement dated 6 March 2025 which confirmed his address as the same as that of the Appellant and that he had not made the information request of the 10 February 2024. It exhibited a page from his passport confirming that he was born in 1971.

13. Solicitors for [NAME] wrote to the Clerk to Irby Parish Council on 31/1/2024 making a subject access request relating to events in August and September 2021 (bundle page D257) which were the subject of contact with Humberside police. The request sought witness statements dated the 5th of August 2021 and the 21st of August 2021 relating to conflict between an officer of the Parish Council and “[NAME]” and a crime report from September 2021. This cited a relentless influx of emails from [NAME] who regularly submitted complaints about “anything and everything”.

14. On 14 July 2024 at 14.10 [NAME] (email [REDACTED]) wrote to Humberside Police raising concerns about emails from the police to North East Lincolnshire Council in 2020. On the same day at 14.11 [NAME] (email [REDACTED] - a different email provider ) wrote to Humberside Police raising concerns in very similar terms (bundle D148).

15. On 4/12/2024 [NAME] (email address beginning [REDACTED]) (bundle D 95) made a subject access request of the ICO concerning his complaint about the Humberside Police. On 5/12/2024 [NAME] (email address beginning [REDACTED] from a different provider ) (bundle D 142) made a very similar request.

16. A similar pairing of email correspondence may be seen at D158: [NAME] to ICO 15/11/2024 at 18.52 and D112 [NAME] to ICO 15/11/2024 at 18.34. Submissions 17. The Appellant noted that the ICO’s original position was that there was only one [NAME], and that the ICO had ridiculed them by denying that there were two. They had both lived at the same address since his son was born. His son’s passport was in the bundle and he produced his passport. He had only written to the ICO once.

18. Counsel for the ICO maintained the position that the two [APPELLANT] and [NAME] were acting in concert. There were enormous similarities between the two subject access requests, there were a large number of messages to the different public bodies which were virtually identical. Material on the Whatdotheyknow website showed the interaction between the requests ascribed to the two [APPELLANT] and [NAME]. The request which is the subject of this appeal was a way of circumventing the previous refusal of the other [NAME]’s request. The two were collusive, one was a proxy for the other. The question for the tribunal was not whether there were two individuals but whether s14 was correctly applied to this request. Consideration 19. The [NAME] who had been in dispute with the Irby Parish Council had pursued the dispute through information requests which were after a time categorised as vexatious. The interaction with the Parish Council was such as to lead to the involvement of the police. In February 2021 one request from [NAME] related to “the data controller registration of Irby upon Humber Parish Council”. A very similar request in February 2024 led to that request being considered part of the same vexatious pattern. The Appellant in these proceedings denies any link to the previous request. The tribunal however is satisfied that the evidence clearly shows a pattern of linkage between the two requesters focussed on a small parish council, which has attracted no interest from other members of the public and focussed on the same issues.

20. Dransfield established that the key question to consider is whether the request is likely to cause a disproportionate or unjustified level of disruption, irritation or distress. This was analysed as the burden on the authority and its staff, the requester’s motive, the value or serious purpose of the request and the causation of distress or the experience of harassment for staff.

21. The history of the interactions between [NAME] and the Parish Council between 2019 and 2022 show a substantial burden, harassment, and disruption to the Parish Council with consequent significant burdens on the ICO. The re-establishment of the functioning of the Council in 2024 and the making of the request similar to a previous request by an individual who represents himself as the father of the [NAME] who made the previous requests shows an intention to continue the harassment demonstrates the intention to harass and impose a burden on the Parish Council for no valid reason.

22. The appeal is dismissed. Signed Judge Hughes Date: 30 June 2026